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[This
is a blog entry posted in response to the above
article. I'm including it here because the writer --
whose bio reads "I've been an enlisted airborne
infantryman, infantry platoon leader, cavalry scout
platoon leader, infantry company commander, and
mobile public affairs detachment commander. I served
in Iraq in 2004..." -- has seen Mick in action and
describes his respect for his work.
--Cyn]
SUNDAY,
APRIL 02, 2006
Fratricide - Why PAO's are taking friendly
fire
An article on Time.com, Iraqi
Commander Says, 'We Didn't Find a Mosque'
by Mick
Ware provides good insight on why the U.S. is losing
the war against insurgent and terrorist propaganda in
Iraq. The last paragraph says it all:
"We
could have come out with our side straight away too,
but first it has to go up the chain and then come
back down," he says. Such a careful, drawn out
process, it seems, may be a luxury the military can
ill afford.
This comes just 45 days or so after Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld raked public affairs officers
(PAO) over the coals for having a "nine to five"
mentality in a 24 hour media cycle. His comments did
not play well with PAOs, who have worked their
behinds off all over the word to stay ahead of their
media-cautious bosses and insurgent/terrorist
propagandists. At a conference in Washington D.C.,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the
Army, and Chief of Public Affairs all had to answer
questions from PAOs about why the Secretary was
calling them out. Not one gave a viable answer why.
The reason: they know Rumsfeld says what's on his
mind, and doesn't normally backtrack. And to my
knowledge, he hasn't.
Leave it to Mick Ware to place the blame into proper
perspective - it's with the chain of command, not the
PAOs. Mick is arguably the smartest journalist
operating in Iraq. He knows how the insurgents and
terrorists think. I once watched him make a G2 [an
Army intelligence officer assigned to a General]
squirm with his spot-on analysis of what was going on
in Mosul - before it was overrun by insurgents in
November 04. He writes extraordinary stories about
Soldiers in battle, some of the best, if not the
best, written about U.S. Soldiers in battle. He'll be
the first to ask tough, insightful questions. He's
respectful, but not afraid to press the issue.
But Mick also tells it like it is, and he's right on
in this case. If you are sitting here in America, all
you heard about this "event" was how outraged the
Iraqi government was, how this was slowing down the
political process, and how American Special Forces
Soldiers had shot up of this "mosque" as evidenced by
their 5.6 shell casings. Coming out with an exclusive
from Time 3-4 days AFTER you've already been drawn
and quartered in the international press to get your
side out is not the way to do business in Iraq. But
somehow, somewhere, someone in the chain kept this
story from getting out. No PAO in their right mind
sat on this one, unless the SF community got in the
way and botched this one, as they are apt to do when
it comes to public affairs. It wouldn't take long for
some PAO to put two and two together after the video
started running on network TV and start to fire
counter-battery.
The Information Operations "counter-battery" exercise
is a tried and true method exercised by the 1st
Infantry Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom II.
In MG (ret.) John R.S. Batiste's excellent article
"The Fight for Samarra: Full-Spectrum Operations in
Modern Warfare," Batiste outlines how the 1st ID PAO
and IO officer quickly attacked propaganda and
unsubstantiated media reports. With this kind of
support, the 1st ID PAO could quickly counter
insurgent/terrorist propaganda with truthful
information, without the bureaucracy of the chain of
command. The PAO was "empowered" to do his job, and
had the support of the staff to do so. With this kind
of backing, working within the chain of command is
not burdensome. Rather, it ensures everyone in the
chain is on the same page.
We live in a media age where message deliverance is
key. It must happen immediately and be seamless. The
insurgents/terrorists know that in our flash minute
society, their message of U.S. troops attacking a
mosque was received, and the image burned in the mind
of the viewer. By the time a coherent response was
developed, and backed with the kind of facts that
Mick Ware puts in his article, it's too late.
I recently spoke with a PAO who lamented the fact
that when an prominent news organization wanted to
get an Iraqi general of their program, the chain of
command took so long to come to a decision that the
outlet backed out. In the end, so did the Army. But
the message was clear - it just wasn't important
enough.
It seemed that in OIF III a conscious decision was
made to cut division level PAOs out of the media
business, and to refer all media calls to Iraq's
JCCs. A good move no doubt - it put an Iraqi
face/spokesperson out front. But it took the
information initiative out of the hands of some
outstanding PAOs, pushing them to the sidelines. It's
time to get back out in front, and stay in front. It
took too long to get the message out about the
alleged mosque attack, giving the
insurgents/terrorists ample time to concoct their own
version, and get it out as truth. Let PAOs do their
jobs. A BCT or battalion commander has incredible
latitude on the battlefield. Our PAOs should have the
same latitude to get their job done. They're
qualified professionals, at the pinnacle of the
career in the information fight.
It's great to hear from you Mick. From the "sickest
PAO" in all Iraq, and on behalf of our PAOs on the
front line, we thank you.
http://militarymediapolitics.blogspot.com/2006/04/fratricide-why-paos-are-taking.html