TIME: Iraq's Resistance
After Saddam
Friday, December 19, 2003
By MICHAEL WARE / BAGHDAD
The insurgents are currently in a process of
consolidation, reconstituting themselves into tighter
and more committed cells, cleaving away the
hangers-on and the remotely suspect. Although
Saddam's arrest has hardly persuaded them to put down
their weapons, some are feeling more cornered than
before, others angrier and even more willing to wreak
havoc. That may mean they're a little more dangerous,
now, their antennae more acutely tuned to pick up
signs of trouble, making them more careful to avoid
unnecessary risk and more vigilant in their
activities.
Their reactions to Saddam's arrest are a complex mix,
reflecting a diversity of motivations behind their
insurgency. The announcement was initially greeted
with genuine shock and disbelief (still lingering in
some quarters). Then, as the daze and denial lifted
for some, the pragmatism that comes with acceptance
began to kick in. And some of the who have evolved
into organized networks — rather than ad hoc groups
and autonomous cells — believe they are entering a
new phase of the war. The U.S. military has snared
its big fish, and is now trawling for the smaller
ones. This means they must adapt, again, re-focus and
move on.
The bad news breaks
Abu Raheman, commander of an Iraqi insurgent cell and
an ex-military officer, had the television on when
the news of Saddam's capture broke on Sunday Dec 14.
Arab satellite channels were full of rumors, then
confirmations by unnamed U.S. sources, and finally
the announcement by administrator Paul Bremer. As the
U.S. diplomat declared "We got him," Abu Raheman sat
quietly. He lent forward on the edge of his seat, his
face set in concentration. From time to time he
passed comment as the conversation around him swayed
back and forth over whether the story was true. While
others become agitated in their shock, he remained
focused, studious. In his mind he weighed what he was
hearing on the television with what he knew of Saddam
and those who had been close to him, of the
military's intelligence-gathering and its operations,
calculating the chances of the man he still calls
President having fallen into U.S. hands. Mid-way
through the afternoon he still wasn't totally
convinced, but he certainly knew not to dismiss it.
Clearly, he thought, he needed more information.
Confirmation from sources and opinions he could
trust.
Even then, he was already contemplating the meaning
of it all. He knew he would have to change the
operations of his cell, and communicate with the
commanders above him before taking any action. In the
days that followed, his methods shifted in accordance
with what he recognized as a new situation. One thing
hadn't changed for his commanders and for the roughly
two dozen guerrillas under his own command — their
will to fight. "We will continue," he said. "We are
not Fedayeen, we are mujahideen. We don't fight for
Saddam, we fight for Iraq."
Operations suspended
Two Baghdad cells with which I am familiar have
temporarily suspended operations, moving into what
one of the cell leaders described as a "technical"
phase during which the new U.S. tactics will be
studied, in order to formulate new modes of
operation. Other cells, even those within the same
broad network, have continued their attacks. At least
one, deeply fanatical cell from this same
organization has actually stepped up its strike rate
in a blush of rage since Saddam's capture. This crew
appears willing to risk the increased danger of
exposure to give violent release to those emotions.
The Monday that followed the arrest announcement saw
a spate of car- and suicide bombings in and around
Baghdad — attacks of a type that U.S. intelligence
officers see as the work of, as one put it, "imported
talent", with Iraqi logistical and intelligence
support . This may indicate that the foreign
terrorist element was first to pick up the ball and
run with it. Car bombings require planning that would
make it unlikely they were launched in response to
the arrest, but these operations certainly weren't
aborted despite increased U.S. security. But the
former Ba'athists weighed in, too, with a
sophisticated ambush on a U.S. patrol in Samarra,
near Tikrit.
Slowing the insurgent momentum
There's no question that Saddam's arrest struck a
heavy psychological blow, even though most of the
fighters weren't pining for his return to power. His
capture has destroyed a sense of infallibility that
had begun to take root among the insurgents. Before
this, they felt they were on a roll, citing the White
House's revising its political plans for Iraq, and
mounting discord in the U.S. over the progress of the
mission. They see their campaign, after all, as more
political than military in nature, knowing they can't
defeat the U.S. military on the battlefield, but
believing they can do so in middle American living
rooms if people tire of the drip feed of casualties
in a war without an apparent end. In this sense,
Saddam's capture was a major victory for the U.S. and
a major defeat for the insurgency on the very turf on
which they agree the conflict will be won or lost.
The dictator's arrest has certainly swung many
doubters in the Middle American living room more
decisively behind the mission. The guerrillas also
know now, more than ever, that they are vulnerable.
If Saddam can be captured, so can anyone. But this
sense may pass — indeed, I can already see it ebbing
away with the week not yet over.
Among the broad spectrum of insurgents — disaffected
and nationalist Iraqis, Fedayeen loyalists, Islamists
and foreign jihadis — only a small proportion is
likely to be deterred by the capture. The grouping it
will hurt most will be the Saddam loyalists,
principally the Fedayeen. They were fighting to
restore him to power, and their principal goal is now
beyond reach. Any flagging of spirits among the
resistance will start with these men. But the others
— the majority — are driven by motives more diverse
and larger than anything connected with Saddam. Some
never cared for him (especially the Islamists), or
saw him for all his flaws, and they cast their fight
in patriotic or religious terms, or a contagion of
both. They respected Saddam, or at least recognized
him as a rallying point. But that's about all. As one
Iraqi cell commander told me during the week, "This
hurts, but it's not the kind of hurt that stops your
body from moving. It's only a small hurt and we can
go on."
From quantity to quality
And if they have the will to fight on, they certainly
have the means to do so. Weapons and ammunition are
in plentiful supply, and money does not appear to be
a concern. The insurgents' resources did not, by and
large, depend on Saddam: Although a lot of their
money has come from the coffers of the former regime,
it has not been Saddam who has controlled the purse
strings. The insurgents appear to have access to deep
reserves of cash, managed by low-profile regime
figures. While Saddam periodically sent cash in
symbolic acts of gratitude or inspiration, say
resistance figures, the bread and butter of the
insurgency has come from Baathist financiers and from
the community — donations, tithes, sponsorship by
powerful families and clans — and these, according to
the insurgents, show no sign of drying up. There may
even be an influx of cash fueled by anger in Sunni
communities over the U.S. victory.
Overall, the new phase of the conflict is likely to
see a decline in the number and frequency of attacks
carried out by each cell, as the guerrillas take more
care to disguise themselves and protect their
operations. But future attacks may be better crafted
and targeted to inflict greater damage. As one
mujahid told me in a dark field one night this week,
"The games are over, this is more serious than ever."
The same may hold for the Coalition.